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Private Antitrust Plaintiffs-
Additional Advantages
Thomas M. Kerr*
A few years ago the United States Supreme Court said:
Congress has expressed its belief that private antitrust litigation'
is one of the surest weapons for effective enforcement of the anti-
trust laws.2
In three important decisions respecting private antitrust treble damage
litigation in recent years, the Supreme Court has expressed the same
belief by substantially strengthening plaintiff's opportunities for dam-
ages in these cases. Two decisions in June, 1968, deprive defendants in
such cases of important defenses previously relied upon, Perma Life
Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.3 and Hanover Shoe, Inc. v.
United Shoe Machinery Corporation.4 On February 24, 1971, the
Supreme Court enormously extended the period during which such
cases may be filed by plaintiffs, allowing Zenith Radio Corporation to
recover treble damages during the period of the statute of limitations
even though the overt acts which caused the defendant's liability oc-
curred much earlier.5
. The recent head of the Antitrust Division has noted the importance
of treble damage antitrust legislation,
But antitrust enforcement is not the province of government
alone. The law also authorizes private parties-individually or in
* Adjunct Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law; Lecturer in Indus-
trial Administration and Law, Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Carnegie-
Mellon University. A former Business Economist and then a Trial Attorney with the
Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice, he is a member of the Committee
on Practice and Procedure, American Bar Association Section on Antitrust Law. A.B.,
1940, Lafayette College; J.D., 1950, The George Washington University Law School.
1. Private suits are authorized by § 4 of the Clayton Act which reads:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United
States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent,
without respect to the amount in controversy and shall recover threefold the
damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's
fee.
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964). Private suits for injunction are authorized by § 16 of the Clayton
Act, Id. § 26.
2. Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co.,
381 U.S. 311, 318 (1965).
3. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
4. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
5. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 91 S. Ct. 795 (1971).
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classes-to sue for treble damages arising. from antitrust violations.
As you are no doubt aware, these damages can be substantial
indeed-particularly after a government case has blazed a trail:
in the electrical equipment cases they exceeded $400 million; in
the antibiotics cases, settlements to date run in the area of $100
million; and in the plumbing cases, plaintiffs are seeking $50
million.6
Basic antitrust prosecution and enforcement are, of course, carried
on by the Department of Justice Antitrust Division and the Federal
Trade Commission. But government enforcement is inevitably selec-
tive, and is subject to political and budgetary variations. The private
action is available to any injured business whether the government has
shown interest in the particular matter or not. One Assistant Attorney
General in Charge of the Antitrust Division has asserted that, as be-
tween governmental enforcement and that of private parties, private
relief is both more desirable and more effective.7
Although the significance of private treble damage antitrust legisla-
tion has been growing for some time," little significant private treble
damage antitrust litigation occurred prior to the landmark Bigelow v.
R.K.O. case in 1946.9 Bigelow concerned the amount of damages re-
coverable in an antitrust action after the plaintiff shows a violation
causing clear and direct injury to his business or property, and proves
actual damages. Prior to Bigelow, it had been difficult to say to the
jury and court what might have been. Bigelow liberalized the rules of
what evidence might be considered in computing damages,
Even where the defendant by his own wrong has prevented a more
precise computation, the jury may not render a verdict based on
speculation or guesswork. But . . . "juries are allowed to act upon
probable and inferential, as well as direct and positive proof" ....
The most elementary conceptions of justice and public policy re-
quire that the wrongdoer shall bear the risk of the uncertainty
which his own wrong act has created.'0
6. Address by Richard W. McLaren, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division,
before the American Bar Association National Institute, New York City, October 21,
1971.
7. Statement by Lee Loevinger, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Study of Mo-
nopoly Power of the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., at 7
(1958).
8. Prior to World War II there were few cases litigated, and plaintiffs succeeded in
only a small percentage of them. See A'r'y GEN. NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE
ANTITRUST LAWS REPORT 378 (1955); MACINTYRE, THE ROLE OF THE PRIVATE LITIGANT IN
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 113, 116-17, 122, 129 (1962).
9. 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
10. Id. at 264-65.
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The case also established a continuing rule that juries may infer lost
profits from past earning records of plaintiff's business and from cur-
rent earning records of similar enterprises."
Bigelow still stands for the principle that once an antitrust violation
is shown to have caused the plaintiff some loss, the defendant should
bear the risk of uncertainty that inheres in measuring the harm he
caused. This uncertainty is especially great in trade regulation and
business activity because economic harm is difficult to measure. In such
cases, Bigelow says, precise proof of damages cannot reasonably be
required of plaintiffs. In this respect Bigelow followed the general rule
that injured parties are held to a less rigid standard of proof in fixing
the amount of damages:
It is true that there was uncertainty as to the extent of the damage,
but there was none as to the fact of damage; and there is a clear
distinction between the measure of proof necessary to establish the
fact that petitioner had sustained some damage, and the measure
of proof necessary to enable the jury to fix the amount.' 2
In commenting on the Bigelow case Judge Charles Wyzanski has sug-
gested:
[T]he ratio decidendi of the Bigelow case is that where the evidence
in an Anti-trust case is such that the discrepancy between plaintiff's
earnings and a competitor's earnings or between plaintiff's earn-
ings in one year and another year could be found by a jury to be
entirely unexplained except by acts of defendants which are un-
lawful under the Anti-trust laws then the jury may find defendants
are the jural cause of the discrepancy, that is, of the loss.' 3
In addition to the proof of damages obstacle, earlier private antitrust
treble damage actions had to meet the argument that some "public
wrong" must be committed before the damages provision could be in-
voked. This apparent difficulty arose from language in a Seventh Circuit
decision that: "[T]he Sherman Act protects the individual injured com-
petitor and affords him relief, but only under circumstances where there
is such general injury to the competitive process that the public at large
suffers economic harm."' 4 An important case in 1959 totally dispelled this
11. Id.; accord, Milwaukee Towne Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 190 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1951),
cert. denied 342 U.S. 909 (1952).
12. Story Parchment Co. v. Patterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562 (1931).
13. Momand v. Universal Film Exchange, 72 F. Supp. 469, 481 (D.C. Mass. 1947), aff'd.
172 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1948).
14. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 273 F.2d 196, 200 (7th
Cir. 1959), rev'd. per curiam 364 US. 656 (1961).
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notion. In Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 5 the owner of a
single appliance store on Mission Street in San Francisco alleged that
most of the manufacturers and distributors of well-known appliance
brands, and some principal retail outlets in San Francisco, had con-
spired among themselves not to sell or supply such appliances to the
plaintiff. The defendants merely submitted affidavits that there were
literally hundreds of other household appliance retailers, often very
close in location to Klor's (i.e. the plaintiff) itself, who sold these brands
and made them available to the public. On this ground, the district
court ruled that the controversy did not amount to a public wrong
proscribed by the Sherman Act, 16 dismissed the complaint, and entered
summary judgment for the defendants.' T The 9th Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed, stating that: "[A] violation of the Sherman Act re-
quires conduct of defendants by which the public is or conceivably may
be ultimately injured." '1 8 The Supreme Court reversed, saying:
As such it [the group boycott combination] is not to be tolerated
merely because the victim is just one merchant whose business is
so small that his destruction makes little difference to the economy.
Monopoly can as surely thrive by the elimination of such small
businessmen, one at a time, as it can by driving out in large groups.
In recognition of this fact, the Sherman Act has consistently been
read to forbid all contracts and combinations "which tend to
create a monopoly" whether "the tendency is a creeping one" or
"one that proceeds at a full gallop" .
Still other developments mark the expansion and vitalization of the
private antitrust treble damage weapon. Under Section 5(a) of the
Clayton Act, the "final judgment or decree" obtained by the United
States in an antitrust proceeding is admissable as "prima facie evi-
dence" in a later private treble damage action.20 A 1952 case in the 8th
Circuit permitted a plaintiff in a subsequent treble damage suit to
introduce in evidence not only the government's decree, but also its
complaint, the bill of particulars, and the court's findings of fact and
conclusions of law.2 1
In other cases it has become evident that more than the final judg-
15. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964).
17. 255 F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1958).
18. Id. at 233.
19. 359 U.S. at 213-14.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 16(z) (1964).
21. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Brookside Theater Corp., 194 F.2d 846 (8th
Cir. 1952).
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ment or decree is made available to the private antitrust treble dam-
age plaintiff. The Supreme Court has suggested that broad access to the
evidence procured by the government be permitted the damage suit
plaintiffs. In Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company the
Court noted a congressional intent: "[T]o assist private litigants in
utilizing any benefits they might cull from government antitrust
actions. '22 The Court described government cases, "as a major source
of evidence for private parties. ' 23 Even grand jury testimony in the
government criminal prosecution may become available to the private
treble damage plaintiff after a nolo contendere plea.24 Recently docu-
ments subpoenaed by several grand juries during an antitrust investiga-
tion of the publishing industry were ordered produced for inspection
by private treble damage plaintiffs. 25
Thus, even before 1968 there had been an accelerated trend to
support and assist the private antitrust treble damage plaintiff. In 1968
and 1971, as suggested previously, plaintiffs in private antitrust litiga-
tion received still further encouragement.
In Perma-Life Mufflers, Inc. ["Midas Muffler Shops"] v. Interna-
tional Parts Corp.26 [the manufacturer of Midas Mufflers and parts],
the Court allowed the franchised shops to prevail for substantial dam-
ages against the franchiser-manufacturer even though the franchise
agreements between them had been illegal. The defendant argued that
the plaintiffs were equally guilty for having entered into, and enjoyed,
"enormous" profits from, the restrictive agreements. The agreements
included terms barring the shops from purchasing from other sources
of supply, preventing a shop from selling outside a designated territory,
tying the sale of mufflers to the shops to the sale of other products in
the Midas line, and requiring the shops to sell at fixed retail prices.
Involved was an ancient defense in law, in pari delicto, literally
meaning "of equal faults." The doctrine, applied for centuries where
a plaintiff seeking damages or equitable relief is himself involved in
some of the same sort of wrongdoing, denies plaintiff any recovery. In
the Midas case, however, the Court bluntly said,
22. 381 U.S. at 317.
23. Id. at 319.
24. City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.. 210 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Pa.
1962); Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. v. City of Fort Pierce, Florida, 323 F.2d 233
(5th Cir. 1963).
25. Harper & Row Publishers Co., Inc. v. Decker, 301 F. Supp. 484 (N.D. Ill.), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 944 (1969).
26. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
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There is nothing in the language of the antitrust acts which indi-
cates that Congress wanted to make the common law pari delicto
doctrine a defense to treble damage actions .... The doctrine of
in pari delicto is not to be recognized as a defense to an anti-
trust action. 27
The opinion emphasized the Court's oft repeated position that
private treble damage action is essential to antitrust enforcement in the
United States:
[T]he purposes of the antitrust laws are best served by insuring
that the private action will be an ever present threat to deter any-
one contemplating business behavior in violation of the antitrust
laws. The plaintiff who reaps the reward of treble damages may be
no less morally reprehensible than the defendant, but the law
encourages his suit to further the overriding public policy in favor
of competition. A more fastidious regard for the relative moral
worth of the parties would only result in seriously undermining
the usefulness of the private action as a bulwark of antitrust en-
forcement (emphasis added). 28
The United States Supreme Court had excused plaintiff's unclean
hands in an earlier private antitrust treble damage case decision. In
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 29 the Court permitted
a wholesaler, engaged in a price-fixing conspiracy, to recover treble
damages from his suppliers who were found to be engaged in an un-
lawful price-fixing conspiracy of their own. Earlier, courts had rejected
the pari delicto defense where the plaintiff was in effect coerced by
economic circumstances to contract with the defendant, and the con-
tract contained illegal provisions that were, realistically speaking, im-
posed unilaterally by the defendant. 30
In Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United States Machinery Corp.,31 decided
a week after Midas, the court disallowed the so-called "passing-on"
defense. The Court ruled that despite the fact the treble damage plain-
tiff shoe manufacturer fully passed its higher costs (resulting from the
defendant's antitrust violation) on to its shoe buyer customers, it could
still prevail in court.
To understand the significance of Hanover Shoe, it is necessary to
retrace the history of the litigation. In 1953 the United States won a
27. Id. at 138, 140.
28. Id. at 139.
29. 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
30. Ring v. Spina, 148 F.2d 647, 652-53 (2d Cir. 1945).
31. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
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civil antitrust suit against United Shoe Machinery charging among
other things that United's policy of leasing its shoe machines and
refusing to sell them caused a monopoly violation.32 The Supreme
Court affirmed the next year,33 and in 1955 Hanover brought this treble
damage suit. Hanover asked for damages from 1939 until the time of
suit. Hanover requested that its damages be measured by the differ-
ences in costs had it been able to purchase the machines, rather than
leasing them. The trial court awarded this difference in costs trebled.3 4
United raised the defense that the plaintiff Hanover had "passed on"
these higher costs to its customers and was therefore not damaged. The
lower courts and the Supreme Court rejected this defense. The Su-
preme Court's economic reasoning in rejecting the defense ran as
follows:
United seeks to limit the general principle that the victim of an
overcharge is damaged within the meaning of § 4 to the extent of
that overcharge. The rule, United argues, should be subject to the
defense that economic circumstances were such that the over-
charged buyer could only charge his customers a higher price
because the price to him was higher. It is argued that in such
circumstances the buyer suffers no loss from the overcharge. This
situation might be present, it is said, where the overcharge is
imposed equally on all of a buyer's competitors and where the
demand for the buyer's product is so inelastic that the buyer and
his competitors could all increase their prices by the amount of the
cost increase without suffering a consequent decline in sales.
We are not impressed with the argument that sound laws of
economics require recognizing this defense. A wide range of factors
influence a company's pricing policies. Normally the impact of a
single change in the relevant conditions cannot be measured
after the fact; indeed a businessman may be unable to state
whether, had one fact been different (a single supply less expen-
sive, general economic conditions more buoyant, or the labor
market tighter, for example), he would have chosen a different
price. Equally difficult to determine, in the real economic world
rather than an economist's hypothetical model, is what effect a
change in a company's price will have on its total sales. Finally,
costs per unit for a different volume of total sales are hard to
estimate. Even if it could be shown that the buyer raised his price
in response to, and in the amount of, the overcharge and that his
margin of profit and total sales had not thereafter declined, there
32. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953).
33. 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
34. 245 F. Supp. 258 (M.D. Pa. 1965).
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would remain the nearly insuperable difficulty of demonstrating
that the particular plaintiff could not or would not have raised his
prices absent the overcharge or maintained the higher price had
the overcharge been discontinued. Since establishing the applica-
bility of the passing on defense would require a convincing show-
ing of each of these virtually unascertainable figures, the task
would normally prove insurmountable. 3, On the other hand, it is
not unlikely that if the existence of the defense is generally
confirmed, antitrust defendants will frequently seek to establish
its applicability. Treble damage actions would often require addi-
tional long and complicated proceedings involving massive evi-
dence and complicated theories.
In addition, if buyers are subjected to the passing on defense,
those who buy from them would also have to meet the challenge
that they passed on the higher price to their customers. These
ultimate consumers, in today's case the buyers of single pairs of
shoes, would have only a tiny stake in a lawsuit and little interest
in attempting a class action. In consequence, those who violate
the antitrust laws by price fixing or monopolizing would retain
the fruits of their illegality because no one was available who
would bring suit against them. Treble damage actions, the im-
portance of which the Court has many times emphasized, would
be substantially reduced in effectiveness.
Our conclusion is that Hanover proved injury and the amount
of its damages for the purposes of its treble damage suit when it
proved that United had overcharged it during the damage period
and showed the amount of the overcharge; United was not entitled
to assert a passing on defense. We recognize that there might be
situations-for instance, when an overcharged buyer had a pre-
existing "cost-plus" contract, thus making it easy to prove that he
has not been damaged-where the considerations requiring that
the passing on defense not be permitted in this case would not be
present. We also recognize that where no differential can be
proved between the price unlawfully charged and some price that
the seller was required by law to charge, establishing damages
might require a showing of loss profits to the buyer.3 6
35. The Court said in a footnote:
The mere fact that a price rise followed an unlawful cost increase does not show that
the sufferer of the cost increase was undamaged. His customers may have been ripe
for his price rise earlier; if a cost rise is merely the occasion for a price increase a
businessman could have imposed absent the rise in his costs, the fact that he was
earlier not enjoying the benefits of the higher price should not permit the supplier
who charges an unlawful price to take those benefits from him without being liable
for damages. This statement merely recognizes the usual principle that the possessor
of a right can recover for its unlawful deprivation whether or not he was previously
exercising it.
392 U.S. 481, 493 & n.9.
36. Id. at 491-94.
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In February, 1971, the Zenith v. Hazeltine case 37 made its second
appearance in the Supreme Court. In 1959, Hazeltine had brought a
patent infringement against Zenith, and in 1963, Zenith had counter-
claimed for damages alleging violations of the Sherman Act 38 by Hazel-
tine's participation in Canadian patent pools-cartels, legal in Canada,
which prohibited Zenith, not a Canadian manufacturer, from selling
in Canada. At the trial below, the court found Zenith damaged in the
amount of $6,297,371 ,89 which damages of course, would be automati-
cally trebled by the statute. Hazeltine replied to Zenith's counterclaim
by asserting the defense of the statute of limitations. It claimed that
part or all of the damages awarded to Zenith were caused by conduct
which had occurred before 1959, and the action should consequently
be barred.
In the most current phase of the litigation, Mr. Justice White stated
the issue as: "[W]hether Zenith can recover in its 1963 suit for damages
suffered after June 1, 1959, as the consequence of pre-1954 conspira
torial conduct. '40 The basic rule in the statute is that damages are
recoverable only if the suit is "commenced within four years after the
cause of action accrued."'41 Generally a cause of action accrues, and the
statute begins to run, when a defendant commits an act that injures a
plaintiff's business. This has been understood to mean that each time
a plaintiff is injured by an act of the defendant in violation of the
antitrust law, a cause of action accrues to the plaintiff to recover the
damages caused by that act and that, as to those damages, the statute of
limitations runs from the commission of the act.
In the February, 1971, holding, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of
Zenith, the treble damage claimant, even though the acts of the
defendant occurred much more than four years prior to the time Zenith
first asserted its claim. The Court reasoned that Zenith could not have
known its future damages at the time the act occurred or during the
time in which the statute would have permitted them to sue. Conse-
quently, the Court permitted Zenith to file its suit much later-at the
time when they were able to compute or calculate their damages. Since
Zenith could not have determined its damages in 1954 or before, they
were permitted to sue for them in 1963 and prevail! The Court said:
37. 91 S. Ct. 795 (1971).
38. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 15, 26 (1964).
39. 239 F. Supp. 51 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
40. 91 S. Ct. at 806.
41. 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1964).
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In antitrust and treble damage actions, refusal to award future
profits as too speculative is equivalent to holding that no cause of
action had yet accrued for any but those damages already suffered.
In these instances, the cause of action for future damages, if they
ever occur, will accrue only on the date they are suffered; there-
after the plaintiff may sue to recover them at any time within
four years from the date they were inflicted. (citations omitted)
Otherwise future damages which could not be proved within four
years of the conduct from which they flowed would be forever
incapable of recovery, contrary to the congressional purpose that
private actions serve "as a bulwark of antitrust enforcement" and
that the antitrust laws fully "protect the victims of the forbidden
practices as well as the public. '42
The Zenith case contains still further encouragement to antitrust
treble damage plaintiffs. The new decision also stands as a holding that
the part of the Clayton Act which tolls the statute of limitations during
the period of time in which the government has brought an action
respecting an alleged antitrust violations operates to toll the statute,
not only respecting claims against parties who are defendants in the
government action, but also tolls the statute with respect to others who
might have been parties in the government suit! On this point the
court said:
The language of 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) expressly provides for tolling of
the statute of limitations "in respect of every private right of ac-
tion ... based in whole or in part on any matter complained of"
in the proceeding instituted by the government (emphasis added).
On the face of this section, a private party who brings suit for a
conspiracy against which the government has already brought suit is
undeniably basing its claim in whole or in part upon the matter
complained of in the government suit, even if the defendant
named in the private suit was named neither as a defendant nor
as a coconspirator by the government. If, that is, the government
sues only certain conspirators, but also alleges and proves during
trial that others were conspirators, the fact of the tolling of the
statute against those so proved but not sued can hardly be denied.
Nor could tolling be denied if a defendant had never been shown
to be a conspirator by the evidence offered in the earlier govern-
ment suit, but then had been proved to be such in the subsequent
private suit.
We find no indication in the legislative history of § 16(b) that
Congress intended it to toll the statute of limitations only against
parties defendant in the government action. Nor is anything
42. 91 S. Ct. at 807.
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cited to us in this respect. On the contrary, as we have said
earlier, Congress, believing that "private antitrust litigation is one
of the surest weapons for effective enforcement of the antitrust
laws," enacted § 16(b) in order to "assist private litigants in utiliz-
ing any benefits they might cull from government antitrust ac-
tion." We see nothing destructive of Congress' purpose in holding
that § 16(b) tolls the statute of limitations against all participants
in a conspiracy which is the object of a government suit, whether
or not they are named as defendants or conspirators therein; in-
deed, to so hold materially furthers congressional policy by per-
mitting private litigants to await the outcome of government
suits and use the benefits accruing therefrom. 43
The result of the Supreme Court decisions has been to establish, as
a reality, enforcement of antitrust legislation through the medium of
the private sector. The Court has made the important recognition
that parties who have been harmed by violations of antitrust legisla-
tion must be given judicial remedies to implement the Congressional
intent contained in the Clayton Act. The Court has equipped a small
business with procedural advantages of its own to match the former
inequities of a powerful defendant's ability to wear away his opponent
through years of procedural maneuvering. As Thurmond Arnold once
said, "If anybody comes to me and wants to sue a great corporation
under the antitrust laws I tell them, 'Just forget about attorneys' fees
for the moment. Have you got $25,000 to put on the line immediately
for expenses of depositions and things of that sort?' 44
The burden upon the plaintiff has only begun to be eased in his
attempt to enforce antitrust laws. Further moves could occur, and
some have even been hinted at by the Supreme Court's opinions in the
three principal cases discussed above. One procedural remedy would
be the recognition by trial judges during pre-trial of a corporate de-
fendant's delaying tactics. His control over extensive discovery and
deposition procedures would greatly alleviate the cost to the plaintiff
who has a fair judicial road to treble damages.
A second step in the further development of private antitrust treble
damage actions may include an expansion of the concept of who may
be a plaintiff-an idea hinted at in Hanover Shoe. Questions may
again reach the courts concerning whether shareholders, officers or
43. Id. at 804-05.
44. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Small Business, The Role of Private Antitrust
Enforcement in Protecting Small Business, of the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business,
89th Cong., 2d Sess., at 164 (1965).
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creditors, or others in analogous situations may recover for the anti-
trust damage to a firm.45 Does a plaintiff have a loss direct enough if
he is the landlord on a percentage lease with the damaged business?4"
And how about suppliers who lose sales to their usual customer, the
business damaged by another's acts in violation of the antitrust pre-
cepts?47 Although Hanover Shoe seems in no way to prevent the in-
jured plaintiff's customers (to whom the cost of the antitrust violation
has been "passed on") from bringing an action, in an earlier case,
treble damage action was denied to a patent licensor whose patent
licensee was injured by an antitrust violation.48
In view of recent trends, however, it seems likely that in future
cases the courts will continue to widen the scope of parties who
deserve redress, once they have been in some way affected by antitrust
violations. It is believed, for example, that courts will increasingly fall
in line with cases that have held where the defendant's customer was
unable to sue, the supplier of the defendant's customer may sue. 49 If
it is the purpose of the courts to enlarge the deterrent effect of the
statute, they may permit new categories of plaintiffs in the private
treble damage action.
We have seen that the trend has been definite in support of reason-
able plaintiff positions in Midas, Hanover Shoe, and Zenith. If the
Supreme Court and the lower courts are to maintain and continue the
trend, they may well consider procedural reforms to relieve plaintiffs
of wearying costs and delays, and they may well extend the plaintiff
opportunity to some others previously thought to be only indirectly
related to the violation and its effects.
45. See Berli v. Silk Assn. of America, 36 F.2d 959 (S.D. N.Y. 1929).
46. See Melrose Realty Co. v. Loew's, Inc., 234 F.2d 518 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 890 (1956).
47. See Snow Crest Beverages, Inc. v. Recipe Foods, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 907 (D. Mass.
1956).
48. Productive Inventions, Inc. v. Trico Products Corp., 224 F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 936 (1956).
49. See Schwartz v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 322 (S.D. N.Y. 1959).
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